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NOTES
DE  FACTO  STATE  ACTION:  SOCIAL  MEDIA
NETWORKS  AND  THE  FIRST  AMENDMENT
Paul Domer*
INTRODUCTION
On October 16, 2018, the world was witness to an immense shock—You-
Tube, the video streaming website, was down for over an hour.1  YouTube’s
dominance on the internet could be seen in the Google (another internet
giant) search trends for the same day.  Google searches for YouTube nor-
mally far outpace searches for the other leading video streaming sites, Vimeo
and Dailymotion.2  On October 16, those sites saw a huge uptick in searches.3
Even then they were outpaced by YouTube, with far more people searching
for answers to their YouTube issues than looking for alternatives.4  This
resulted from YouTube being down for only one hour.
The dominance of a select few social media companies on the internet
raises important implications for the free flow of information and ultimately
the law.  Traditionally, courts have treated the right of free speech—like all
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Arts in
History, Rhodes College, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Richard Garnett for his
guidance, and my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their continued support.
All errors are my own.
1 Saheli Roy Choudhury, Google’s YouTube Suffers a Major Outage, CNBC (Oct. 16,
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/17/googles-youtube-outage-affected-users-in-us-
australia-asia-europe.html.  A similar hours-long outage occurred a decade earlier, when an
attempt by the government of Pakistan to block access to the site in that country inadver-
tently affected the entire world.  Ryan Singel, Pakistan’s Accidental YouTube Re-Routing
Exposes Trust Flaw in Net, WIRED (Feb. 25, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/02/paki
stans-accid/.
2 Search Terms Comparison, GOOGLE TRENDS, https://trends.google.com/trends/ex
plore?date=2018-10-01%202018-10-20&geo=US&q=vimeo,dailymotion,youtube (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
3 Greg Sandoval, The World Is So Dependent on YouTube for Videos That People Frantically
Searched for Alternatives During Its 90-Minute Outage, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2018), https://
www.businessinsider.com/vimeo-and-dailymotion-big-winners-during-youtubes-two-hour-
outage-2018-10.
4 See id.; Search Terms Comparison, supra note 2.
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constitutional rights in the American system—as a protection against govern-
ment intrusion only.5  This limitation reflects the longstanding belief that
government, given its immense power, is the primary threat to liberty.6  The
exception, for when a private entity is engaged in a “public function,” has
been narrowly construed by the courts.7
Technological change has in turn changed the variables that are used in
this calculus.  While governments, if shorn of constitutional restraints, retain
the power to censor, private social media companies arguably possess the
same power.  A great deal of speech, including political speech, is conducted
online.8  Further, a huge amount of this activity on the internet can be traced
to just five companies:  Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet,
the parent company of Google.9  Of those, YouTube and Facebook are dedi-
cated social media sites.  Though private entities, the social media giants are
the forums in which public discourse takes place.  Facebook alone is host to
more than two billion users,10 a larger population than any country.11  More-
over, the social media entities hold themselves out as public forums where
ideas can be freely exchanged.12  They have become, despite their private
ownership, heavily intertwined with the very public function of speech.
5 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (“In this connection it is proper to
state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression,
cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in
the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.”).
6 E.g., John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV.
569, 575 (2005) (“[G]overnment exists to protect individual freedom, and for that purpose
it must also be restrained.”).
7 See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (noting that consti-
tutional actions may only be brought against a private entity where there is “state action
present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State”).
8 See generally Frederica Liberini et al., Politics in the Facebook Era: Evidence from the 2016
US Presidential Elections 2 (Univ. of Warwick Ctr. for Competitive Advantage in the Glob.
Econ., Working Paper No. 389, 2018).
9 Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s Frightful Five: They’ve Got Us, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/technology/techs-frightful-five-theyve-got-us.html.
Google is also YouTube’s parent company.  Kevin B. Johnston, Top 4 Companies Owned by
Google, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/investing/companies-owned-by-
google/ (last updated June 25, 2019).
10 Most Popular Social Networks Worldwide as of October 2018, Ranked by Number of Active
Users (in Millions), STATISTA, https://web.archive.org/web/20181021124855/https://www
.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-number-of-users/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Most Popular Social Networks].
11 See 2019 World Population by Country, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopula-
tionreview.com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 World Population].
12 See, e.g., About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebookapp/about/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (stating its “[m]ission” is to “[g]ive people the power to build
community and bring the world closer together”); About YouTube, YOUTUBE, https://www
.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (“Our mission is to give everyone a
voice and show them the world.”).
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“A right of free correspondence between citizen [and] citizen . . .
whether public or private . . . is a natural right; it is . . . one of the objects for
the protection of which society is formed, [and] municipal laws estab-
lished.”13  Thus Thomas Jefferson described the kinds of interactions that
now take place on social media, interactions necessarily involving speech.
Tellingly, he mentioned that private interactions, not only those involving a
state actor, were part of the natural right.  Typically, however, American
courts only recognize governments as threats to freedom of speech, under
the state action doctrine.14  A case involving an exception to the state action
doctrine in the realm of free speech only reached the U.S. Supreme Court in
1946.  In that case, Marsh v. Alabama, a Jehovah’s Witness was arrested and
convicted of trespassing for proselytizing on a public sidewalk that nonethe-
less was, like everything else in the “company town,” privately owned.15  The
Court reversed, holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied
against a private actor if it exercised all the powers and responsibilities tradi-
tionally associated with a government—policing, utilities, and traffic control,
for example.16  Writing for the majority, Justice Black declared, “The more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in
general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.”17
The Court later circumscribed the very circumscriptions of property
owners’ rights.  In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,18 and again in Hudgens v. NLRB,19
the Court severely limited the ability to claim a right of free speech in spaces
open to the public but privately owned.  Both cases involved protests in pub-
lic shopping areas that were private property, and in both the Court reasoned
that because the property owners did not exercise the level of government-
like control as did the company town in Marsh, the exception to the state
action doctrine did not apply.20  The Court did uphold a challenge to private
speech restrictions in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, but only because it
deferred to the California Supreme Court’s broader interpretation of that
state’s constitution.21
The line of cases stretching back to Marsh all involved access to privately
owned physical spaces.  The rise of the internet has created new quandaries.
Is the internet akin to a privately owned shopping space open to the public?
Or is it that the modern public forum is, at the very least, a “digital company
town,” and thus where constitutional protections apply?  The Court has not
13 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Sept. 7, 1797), in 7 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1795–1801, at 171, 172 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P.
Putnam’s Sons 1896) (emphasis added).
14 See Fee, supra note 6, at 577–78.
15 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502–04, 513 (1946).
16 Id. at 505–09.
17 Id. at 506.
18 407 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972).
19 424 U.S. 507, 518–21 (1976).
20 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 508, 519–21; Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 568–69.
21 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79–80, 88 (1980).
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yet taken a case involving free speech on the internet in a dispute between
private actors.  In 2017, it did take a case involving state-imposed restrictions
on access to social media.  In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court struck
down a state law banning registered sex offenders from using social media.22
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy declared access to public forums a
“fundamental principle of the First Amendment” and social media as the pri-
mary place for exchange of views in the modern world.23  But that case
explicitly dealt with government action, and whether the internet should be
considered a public forum in speech disputes among private actors was left
unresolved.  The lower courts have produced rulings both in favor24 and
against25 the proposition that the state action doctrine is less strict when deal-
ing with the internet.
It is almost indisputable that the internet serves an indispensable role in
modern public discourse.  Social media stands out among online content for
both its size and scope.  Within the United States, more than 60% of internet
users—nearly 170 million people—use Facebook,26 and some 58% of Ameri-
cans use YouTube.27  And Americans do not just use those sites for finding
friends and watching cat videos.  In 2017, 43% of Americans frequently got
their news online, to the detriment of traditional sources such as television.28
Some 45% of Americans get at least some of their news from Facebook
alone.29
This reliance on social media has had an immense impact on the politi-
cal sphere.  Political campaigns have turned to “microtargeting”—gathering
data on individual social media users and then targeting advertisements spe-
cifically at those individual users.30  President Barack Obama’s campaign
made widespread use of microtargeting to get out the vote in support of his
reelection in 2012.31  The social media presence of Donald Trump’s cam-
22 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1733, 1738 (2017).
23 Id. at 1735.
24 See, e.g., Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2018).
25 See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064, 2018 WL 1471939, at *1,
*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018).
26 Niall Ferguson, What Is to Be Done? Safeguarding Democratic Governance in the Age of
Network Platforms, HOOVER INST. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/what-
be-done-safeguarding-democratic-governance-age-network-platforms.
27 Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017, PEW
RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-
media-platforms-2017/.
28 Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, Americans’ Online News Use Is Closing In on TV News
Use, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/07/
americans-online-news-use-vs-tv-news-use/.
29 Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 27.
30 Jeff Semple, Micro-Targeting: How Facebook Is Selling You to Advertisers, GLOB. NEWS
(June 23, 2018), https://globalnews.ca/news/4293050/microtargeting-facebook-selling-
you/.
31 Allison Brennan, Microtargeting: How Campaigns Know You Better than You Know Your-
self, CNN (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/politics/voters-microtarget
ing/index.html.
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paign in 2016 is already notorious, but it was undoubtedly effective.
Microtargeting by the Trump campaign focused on key swing states like
Michigan and Wisconsin.32  The Trump campaign focused nearly half of its
spending on digital media, and its social media microtargeting has been
shown to have boosted voter turnout among Republican ranks.33
Social media sites recognize their influence, and they have sought to
exercise a level of control over speech on their platforms akin to government
regulation.  Among social media sites, Facebook stands out for its sheer size.
Facebook recognized the political impact advertising on its site had, and after
the 2016 election required “Paid for by” disclosures on political advertise-
ments on its site.34  Federal law already requires such disclosures for political
ads in traditional media;35 now the same has been achieved for a huge por-
tion of online political advertising, initiated by a private actor, not the gov-
ernment.  With regard to all forms of content on its site, Facebook imposes
its “Community Standards,” which prohibit any language attacking “pro-
tected characteristics” such as race or gender.36  In contrast, the Constitution
precludes the government from any content-based restrictions on speech
outside a few narrow categories like defamation.37  For the millions of Ameri-
cans who use Facebook regularly, they are entitled to less freedom of speech
on that platform than they are accustomed to elsewhere, and entirely at
Facebook’s discretion.
Access to social media platforms is no small matter for modern dis-
course.  Some commentators have explicitly called Facebook a “company
town,”38 and more importantly have pointed out that joining this modern
social commons is hardly optional for anyone wanting a public voice.39  This
digital company town has few precedents, making it difficult to fit a right of
access to social media into existing jurisprudence.  The closest historical par-
allel may be Hollywood in the era of the Hays Code, during which all films
produced in the United States had to meet the moral standards of a small
32 Josh Meyer, Democrats Fume over Parscale’s Limited Answers on Russian Digital Meddling,
POLITICO (March, 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/19/trump-russian-
digital-parscale-470263; see also Parscale: TV News “Thought I Was a Joke,” CBS NEWS (Oct. 8,
2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/parscale-tv-news-thought-i-was-a-joke/.
33 Liberini et al., supra note 8, at 1–2, 5.
34 Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK (May 24, 2018), https://news
room.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-political-content/.
35 See, e.g., Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 311, 116
Stat. 81, 105–06.
36 Community Standards: Objectionable Content, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
37 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717–18 (2012) (plurality opinion)
(listing categories of constitutionally unprotected speech).
38 Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook: The Privatization of Our Privates and Life in the Company
Town, TECHNOSOCIOLOGY (May 14, 2010), http://technosociology.org/?p=131 [hereinafter
Tufekci, Facebook].
39 See Zeynep Tufekci, Google Buzz: The Corporatization of Social Commons, TECHNOSOCI-
OLOGY (Feb. 17, 2010), http://technosociology.org/?p=102 [hereinafter Tufekci, Google
Buzz].
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cadre of censors who operated completely free of the government.40  This
had a stultifying effect on American cinema for decades, but even then it was
restricted to a single medium.  Social media’s reach in modern times is even
more pervasive.
Objectors might claim that social media companies have their own free
speech rights that would be curtailed if they could not control their own
content.  They would be right—if social media companies counted as pub-
lishers.41  But the social media giants of today do not hold themselves out as
publishers.  Facebook42 and YouTube43 alike advertise themselves as places
where the user, not the company, can produce and post content.  This self-
image comports nicely with the law, for since 1996 a federal statute defines
online content hosts as not being publishers and immunizes them from any
kind of civil liability.44  If social media sites are not publishers in any other
respects, there is no reason to treat them as such for freedom of speech
purposes.
This Note argues that the social media companies fit into the historical
exception to the state action doctrine established in Marsh, such that the
largest social media companies, given their power, should be considered pub-
lic forums despite their private ownership.  Therefore, those companies,
though private, could be subject to First and Fourteenth Amendment claims
of violating the right of free speech.  Part I of this Note surveys the history of
the public forum element of the state action doctrine in free speech cases.
Part II will look at the scope of the social media companies’ role in speech
and why it should thus be subject to free speech protections.  Part III will
consider some objections to this proposed extension of the law.
I. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE, PRIVATE ENTITIES, AND FREE SPEECH
Generally, the courts recognize that only government actors can infringe
constitutional rights, a stance designated the “state action doctrine.”45  If the
actor that allegedly violated a plaintiff’s rights is not connected to the state,
then the plaintiff’s claims fail, regardless of the rights at issue or the nature of
the alleged infringement.46  In the area of free speech, the courts have recog-
nized certain instances where claims of constitutional violations can be
brought against private actors in spite of the state action doctrine.  In such
cases, the issue was less the speech itself than the purported right of access to
a forum for the purpose of speaking.  Different lines of cases have touched
40 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 116–17 (2010).
41 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
42 Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last updated July
31, 2019).
43 About YouTube, supra note 12.
44 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133,
138 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).
45 Fee, supra note 6, at 573.
46 Id. at 575.
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on access to physical spaces and, more recently, the internet.  These forums
will be discussed in turn.
A. Access to Privately Owned Public Places
Private owners of public places can be held to constitutional guarantees
of free speech in certain circumstances.  The Supreme Court has upheld this
principle, but it has limited its scope to instances where the private owner is
acting like a government.  This limitation is based on a respect for the private
owner’s right of free speech, with the decision to exclude certain speakers
itself considered speech.
The first notable case on this issue was Marsh.47  The town of Chickasaw,
Alabama, was a “company town,” owned and operated by Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation.48  The town had residences, shops, and streets like any other
town, and was fully accessible to the public.49  It was policed by a county
sheriff’s deputy who, when patrolling the town, was paid by the company.50
Thus there was “nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shop-
ping center except the fact that the title to the property belong[ed] to a
private corporation.”51
A Jehovah’s Witness, surnamed Marsh, sought to distribute religious
literature on the sidewalks of the town’s main business district.52  She was
informed that she could only do so with a permit, that no permit would be
forthcoming, and that she must leave the premises.53  Upon her refusal, she
was arrested by the deputy employed by the company.54  She was subse-
quently convicted in state court for trespassing and appealed, arguing that
the ban on her presence in the town violated her rights to freedom of the
press and of religion, as protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.55
Marsh ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court.  There, Alabama
argued that the conviction was valid, as the town was legally private property,
and so under the full control of its owner; the Alabama court had rejected
any contention that constitutional protections applied in the case.56  The
Court disagreed, finding that the private ownership of the property was not
the end of the matter.  Writing for the Court,57 Justice Black declared, “Own-
47 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
48 Id. at 502, 504.
49 Id. at 502–03.
50 Id. at 502.
51 Id. at 503.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 503–04.
56 Id. at 504–06.
57 Justice Jackson did not take part in the consideration of the case; of the other eight
Justices, three dissented from Justice Black’s opinion. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate
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ership does not always mean absolute dominion.”58  He justified this by say-
ing, “The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”59  For example, the
private owners of roads and bridges could not block access to certain individ-
uals, as the properties in question serve a public function.60  Just as the state
permitted some private entities to operate roads and bridges, so had Ala-
bama allowed a private company to operate an entire town.61  Citizens of
company towns had no less constitutional protection than did citizens of
other towns.62  Under those circumstances, individuals are protected in their
freedom of speech and religion, even against private entities.63  Justice Black
concluded, “When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property
against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we
must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position.”64
It is important to note that the private entity’s infringement of another
private individual’s rights ultimately rested on intervention by the state.
Marsh was arrested by a deputy sheriff who was paid by the private company
but was nonetheless an agent of the government.  Her punishment for trying
to hand out religious literature in the town was not just forced removal from
the premises, but a criminal conviction in the courts of Alabama.  Indeed, it
was Alabama, not the company, that was the respondent in the case.  The
private party seeking to restrict another private party’s access to a public
forum was ultimately dependent on state action.  One private actor’s restric-
tions against another were meaningless without enforcement by the state.  In
other cases, the Supreme Court held that private action could violate consti-
tutional rights precisely because of the necessary involvement of the state.65
The next time the issue of access to a privately owned public place came
before the Court, the connection to state action was even more tenuous, and
yet the Court found a constitutional violation.  A union protest was held in
the parking lot outside a supermarket located in the Logan Valley Mall in
concurring opinion. See id. at 510–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 512–17 (Warren,
C.J., Reed and Burton, JJ., dissenting).
58 Id. at 506.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 507.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 508.
64 Id. at 509.
65 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8, 20 (1948) (finding private agreements to
restrict housing to certain racial groups unconstitutional); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 524 (1985) (arguing that all private depriva-
tions of rights involve state action).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL208.txt unknown Seq: 9  3-JAN-20 9:50
2019] social  media  networks  and  the  first  amendment 901
Pennsylvania.66  The owners of both the mall and supermarket sought an
injunction against the picketers, arguing they were trespassing.67  The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the injunction solely on the grounds
that the mall was private property, and thus the picketers were trespassing.68
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the freedom of speech of
the picketers had been violated.  Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall
found the similarities with Marsh to be “striking.”69  As in Marsh, the Logan
Valley Mall had the attributes of a “business district”: it included several busi-
nesses and was freely accessible to the public.70  The key difference with
Marsh was that the owners of the mall in Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley did not offer any municipal services.71  However,
Marshall noted that the holding in Marsh discussed constitutionally pro-
tected activity in a commercial area.  In that regard, there was no difference
between Marsh and Logan Valley, as both cases involved expressive activity in a
commercial area that was privately owned but publicly accessible.  Given this,
“the State may not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws,
wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First
Amendment rights on the premises,” provided that the exercise was “gener-
ally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.”72  The
picketers were protesting the way in which that store was being operated, so
their protest was “consonant” with its use; Marshall declined to opine on
whether a protest unrelated to activity in the store would be protected.73
Requiring the picketers to remain on the public roads outside the shopping
mall would “substantially hinder the communication of the ideas which peti-
tioners seek to express to the patrons of [the supermarket].”74  Marshall con-
cluded by quoting Justice Black in Marsh, declaring once again that
ownership was not “absolute dominion.”75
For his part, Justice Black dissented from the majority in Logan Valley,
stating bluntly that his opinion in Marsh was “never intended to apply to this
kind of situation.”76  Black’s dissent noted that the premises involved in
Marsh were an entire town, not merely a single store therein.77  Moreover,
the picketers in Logan Valley had conducted their protest in the loading area
of the supermarket, a much more limited—and much more private—space
66 Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308, 310–11 (1968).  Interestingly, none of the picketers were actually employees of the
supermarket. Id. at 311.
67 Id. at 312.
68 Id. at 313.
69 Id. at 317.
70 Id. at 318.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 319–20.
73 Id. at 320 n.9.
74 Id. at 323.
75 Id. at 325.
76 Id. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 330–31.
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than the one in Marsh.78  Black insisted that the correct reading of Marsh was
to treat private property as if it were public only if the private property had
“all the attributes of a town,” including “residential buildings, streets, a sys-
tem of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a ‘business block’ on which busi-
ness places are situated.”79  In subsequent cases, Black’s more limited view
would become the doctrine of the Court.
Just four years later, the Court faced a situation almost identical to that
of Logan Valley but came to the opposite conclusion.  In Lloyd Corp., a mall
sought an injunction against individuals who had been distributing handbills
in protest of the Vietnam War in the public areas of the mall.80  The lower
courts had found the mall to be a public forum akin to those in Marsh and
Logan Valley and found the injunction violated the protestors’ First Amend-
ment freedoms.81  However, the distribution of antiwar handbills was totally
unrelated to the normal use of the mall, presenting a question different from
that in Logan Valley.82  Additionally, the mall in Logan Valley was in an isolated
area and so “no other reasonable opportunities for the pickets to convey
their message to their intended audience were available.”83  Given that pub-
licly owned sidewalks were just outside the mall, the protestors had an alter-
native forum in which to express their message.84  Nor was the Court faced
with a company town as in Marsh.85  The majority pronounced that the
“Court [had] never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise
general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondis-
criminatorily for private purposes only.”86  As such, the mall’s desired injunc-
tion against the handbill distribution did not violate the First Amendment
rights of the distributors.87
Mirroring Justice Black, Justice Marshall—the author of the majority in
Logan Valley—dissented in Lloyd Corp.  He found the mall in question to be
much like a business district as described in Marsh and Logan Valley, given
that it was viewed as such by the local municipality.88  The shopping center in
Lloyd Corp. had often allowed nontenants and nonshoppers to host events
and marches on its premises, meaning it had clearly been held out as a public
forum.89  As public entities increasingly outsourced more areas and services
to private ownership, the clashes with the First Amendment would continue,
78 Id. at 328, 331.
79 Id. at 332 (quoting Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946)).
80 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 556 (1972).
81 Id. at 556–57.
82 Id. at 560.
83 Id. at 563.
84 Id. at 566–67.
85 Id. at 563.
86 Id. at 568.
87 Id. at 570.
88 Id. at 576 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 578–79.
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and if mere private ownership meant the First Amendment could not apply,
then “free speech [would become] a mere shibboleth.”90
While Lloyd Corp. did not explicitly overrule Logan Valley, the end came
two years later in Hudgens.91  The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),
relying on Logan Valley, had sanctioned a mall owner for restricting employ-
ees of a store in the mall from holding a strike march on the premises.92  The
NLRB concluded that such a restriction was a clear violation of the strikers’
free speech rights.93  The Court invoked Black’s dissent in Logan Valley for a
narrower understanding of Marsh’s application of the First Amendment to a
private actor.94  The majority pointed to cases involving the regulation of
speech by local governments, all of which noted that the First Amendment
protected against government action.95  Ultimately, the Court held that,
except in the unique instance of a company town as found in Marsh, “the
constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case
[involving private action].”96
When the Court did uphold a free speech challenge to a private restric-
tion in the wake of Hudgens, it did so only because a state constitutional pro-
vision provided the rationale.  In PruneYard, several high school students who
were taking signatures for a petition on the grounds of a public shopping
center were forced to leave by a security guard, citing the center’s policy
against expressive activity not related to mall business.97  The students filed
suit against the center, arguing that their free speech rights under the Cali-
fornia Constitution were being violated.98  The California Supreme Court
agreed on the grounds that the California Constitution recognized a right of
free speech generally, which was enforceable even against a private entity.99
The shopping center pointed to the Court’s holding in Lloyd Corp. and
asserted that no free speech claims could be brought against them as a pri-
vate entity.100  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with the center and
upheld the decision of the California court.  Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist stated, “Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not ex proprio vigore
limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign
right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
90 Id. at 586.
91 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
92 Id. at 508–10.
93 Id. at 510.
94 See id. at 518–20.
95 Id. at 520.
96 Id. at 521.
97 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980).
98 See id. at 76–78.
99 Id. at 78.  The relevant part of the California Constitution reads as follows: “Every
person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech
or press.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a).
100 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 80.
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than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”101  Thus, California could
allow its citizens rights to expressive activity on certain privately owned prem-
ises, subject only to the federal Constitution’s limits on the taking of private
property without just compensation.102  There was nothing in the case to sug-
gest that allowing the students to collect signatures at the shopping center
would have interfered with its normal business.103  PruneYard Shopping
Center could only make such “time, place, and manner regulations that
[would be necessary to] minimize any interference with its commercial
functions.”104
Justice Marshall concurred and in his opinion recalled his earlier opin-
ion in Logan Valley.105  To Justice Marshall, open-air shopping centers like in
that case and in PruneYard were open to the public in a general manner akin
to streets and parks.106  As such, the owners’ property rights were not
infringed upon, and the free speech interests of the students rightly won
out.107  Like Justice Marshall, all the other Justices concurred in the judg-
ment, but other concurrences were not as full of praise for the majority.108
Justice Powell concurred on the understanding that the decision was limited
only to shopping centers of the open-air design, fully accessible to the public,
such as the one in question.109  He was concerned that construing the deci-
sion more broadly might result in private property owners being forced by
the state to accommodate views with which they disagreed.110
Such concerns reflected the very limited concept of the public function
exception to the state action doctrine in place since Hudgens, which remains
the law to this day.  This particular line of cases all related to the right of
access to physical spaces for free speech purposes.  In each case, the property
rights of the private owners were at stake, but so were the rights of the owners
to control expression that might be imputed to them by virtue of it occurring
on their property.
B. Right of Access on the Internet
The recency of the internet has given the courts little opportunity to
address the freedom of speech with regards to the internet, with only two
cases reaching the Supreme Court in the past two decades.111  Given the
nature of the internet, and social media in particular, the extension of the
101 Id. at 81 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 83.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 89–90.
107 See id. at 89–95.
108 Justice Blackmun most curiously dissented from only a single sentence in Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion. Id. at 88–89 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
109 Id. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 98–100.
111 The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (2017).
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public forum to allow free speech suits against privately owned entities may
yet be possible.
In Packingham, the Court held that laws restricting access to online social
media were an infringement of the First Amendment right to free expres-
sion.112  At issue was a North Carolina law that barred registered sex offend-
ers from using social networking sites if those networks were also available to
minor children.113  One such registered sex offender was arrested for log-
ging onto Facebook simply to thank God that his traffic ticket was dis-
missed.114  On appeal from conviction in the North Carolina state courts, the
Supreme Court reversed.115  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
described the ability of “persons [to] have access to places where they can
speak and listen” as a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment.”116
He described “cyberspace” as the most important forum for the exchange of
ideas, referring to “the ‘vast democratic forums of the Internet’ in general,
and social media in particular.”117  Justice Kennedy warned that “[t]he
nature of a revolution in thought can be that, in its early stages, even its
participants may be unaware of it.”118  The transformations brought to soci-
ety by the internet amounted to a revolution, and Justice Kennedy warned
that the Court should “exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the
First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that
medium.”119  The Court consequently held that a law denying access to social
media prevented the defendant from freely exercising his First Amendment
rights and so was unconstitutional.120  The reversal nonetheless rested on the
fact that at issue was a state law, not the actions of a private entity.121
In wake of the holding in Packingham (or, more exactly, Justice Ken-
nedy’s rhetoric), lower courts have had a mixed approach to treating social
media as a public forum graced with First Amendment protection.  In the
most celebrated case, the Twitter profile of the President of the United States
was deemed a public forum and thus subject to First Amendment protec-
tion.122  Several Twitter users tweeted messages critical of President Donald
Trump to his official Twitter profile, @realDonaldTrump; the President
blocked them soon after, such that neither party could view the other’s
tweets.123  The Knight First Amendment Institute and the blocked accounts
112 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
113 Id. at 1733.
114 Id. at 1734.
115 Id. at 1734–35.
116 Id. at 1735.
117 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 868 (1997)).
118 Id. at 1736.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1738.
121 Id.
122 Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
123 Id. at 553.
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sued the President and his press secretary.124  The district court held that the
President’s Twitter account, because it offered a space where the general
public could interact with a public official, constituted a public forum.125
Therefore, “[t]he viewpoint-based exclusion of the individual plaintiffs from
that designated public forum [was] proscribed by the First Amendment and
[could not] be justified by the President’s personal First Amendment inter-
ests.”126  The court noted Justice Kennedy’s dicta describing the internet as a
“vast democratic forum,” but due to the lack of other historical precedents it
did not find Packingham dispositive by itself.127
Suits against private entities in the lower courts have yet to be fully
resolved, and these have gone both for and against the idea of social media as
a modern public forum.  One of the latter such cases involved a YouTube
user’s suit against Google, YouTube’s parent company, dismissed for failure
to state a colorable claim of state action.128  Prager University, a conservative-
leaning YouTube channel, claimed that YouTube was unjustly censoring its
videos, primarily by placing age restrictions on them—thus limiting their visi-
bility in searches on the site—and by demonetizing them by stripping the
videos of the ability to generate ad revenue.129  Prager University alleged that
this was due to YouTube’s liberal bias, and thus it was engaging in impermis-
sible viewpoint discrimination.130  Recognizing that YouTube was a private
entity, Prager cited Packingham as a basis for judging the social media site to
be a public forum131 and thus subject to suit under the doctrine originating
in Marsh.132  The court found this argument unconvincing, noting that Pack-
ingham involved a law and thus clearly involved state action.133  As for Marsh,
the court looked at the line of cases stretching to Hudgens and held that
Marsh’s doctrine was applicable only to a physical space, namely a company-
owned town.134  YouTube simply did not engage “in one of the ‘very few’
public functions that were traditionally ‘exclusively reserved to the State.’”135
One of the more recent cases to cite Packingham has, in fact, been
allowed to proceed on the merits.136  In Sandvig v. Sessions, the plaintiffs are
four professors seeking to analyze data from real estate websites to gauge the
124 Id. at 553–55.
125 Id. at 574–75.
126 Id. at 580.
127 Id. at 574.
128 Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064, 2018 WL 1471939, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2018).  The suit also involved claims of false advertising under the Lanham Act,
which were also dismissed by the court. Id. at *9.  Those claims are beyond the scope of
this Note.
129 Id. at *1–2.
130 Id.
131 Id. at *8.
132 Id. at *6.
133 Id. at *8.
134 Id. at *6–8.
135 Id. at *8 (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978)).
136 See Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2018).
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potential effects of racial discrimination.137  For some websites, such data
mining is a violation of their terms of service as a kind of unauthorized
access138 and would subject the researchers  to criminal liability under fed-
eral law.139  The plaintiffs sued, arguing the law criminalizing the unautho-
rized access was a violation of their First Amendment rights to engage in
expressive conduct, namely research.140  Normally, there would be no right
of free speech allowing access to another’s private property, even a web-
site.141  The court posed the question, “Why, then, would it violate the First
Amendment to arrest those who engage in expressive activity on a privately
owned website against the owner’s wishes?  The answer is that, quite simply,
the Internet is different.”142  Citing to Packingham, the court deemed the
internet to be a public forum, subject to First Amendment protections.143
The terms of service imposed by privately owned websites were not disposi-
tive, as “simply placing contractual conditions on accounts that anyone can
create, as social media and many other sites do, does not remove a website
from the First Amendment protections of the public Internet.”144  Thus, the
court permitted the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims to proceed,145
though it should be noted that despite the court’s reasoning, the defendant
was a state actor—namely, the then-sitting Attorney General of the United
States.146
The Court recently took up the question of access in a similar situation:
public access cable channels.147  The case did not involve nor even mention
the internet, but it reaffirmed a strict adherence to the state action doctrine.
There, filmmakers claimed it was a First Amendment violation when Manhat-
tan Neighborhood Network (MNN) refused to air their content.148  MNN is
a private entity, but New York City designated it as the local public access
television network to enable those outside the mainstream media to produce
and air content.149  Despite its status being government given, the Court
ruled that MNN was not a state actor.150  Justice Kavanaugh put it bluntly:
“The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit private abridgment of speech.”151
Exceptions to the state action doctrine apply only when a private actor
137 Id. at 8–9.
138 See id. at 8.
139 Id. at 8–10.
140 Id. at 10.
141 See id. at 11 (first citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); and then citing
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567–68 (1972)).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 12–13.
144 Id. at 13.
145 Id. at 34.
146 Id. at 10.
147 Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
148 Id. at 1927.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1926.
151 Id. at 1928.
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engages in activities historically reserved to the government, and the “opera-
tion of public access channels on a cable system is not a traditional, exclusive
public function.”152  The Court noted such functions include “running elec-
tions and operating a company town.”153  As will be discussed later in this
Note, online social media has gained a role in the conduct of elections.
Moreover, MNN claims that, at most, it reaches “hundreds of thousands” of
people.154  Online social media, this Note shall show, is much, much larger.
It remains to be seen exactly how the courts will treat free speech issues
on the internet in the wake of Packingham.  It is possible for a private entity to
be subject to First Amendment challenges if it serves a public function akin
to a state actor, a doctrine that dates to Marsh.  But Marsh applied the doc-
trine in the unique situation of a company-owned town, a very specific kind
of physical space.  Social media’s control, meanwhile, is best reflected by
viewing social media as a digital town.
II. SOCIAL MEDIA: THE PUBLIC FORUM OF TODAY
This Part will look at the role social media plays as the modern public
forum.  It will begin by looking at the size and reach of the largest social
media platforms, with a particular focus on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube.
These platforms are among the most visited websites and are increasingly not
only a primary source of news, but a primary battlefield for elections.  With
their immense size comes a system of content and disclosure regulations that
mimics the regulatory power of a state while being entirely controlled by the
social media entities themselves.  These enforcement activities have already
had a censorial effect that would be impermissible in government hands.
A. The Size and Power of Social Media
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—all American companies—dominate
online content sharing.155  YouTube was the second most visited website in
the United States in 2018, after Google, with Facebook coming in third.156
Twitter was the eighth most visited site.157  Interestingly, the first and second
152 Id. at 1926.
153 Id. at 1929 (first citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468–70 (1953) (plurality opin-
ion); then citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505–09 (1946); then citing Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662–66 (1944); and then citing Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73,
84–89 (1932)).
154 MANHATTAN NEIGHBORHOOD NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT 2016: REDEFINING COMMU-
NITY MEDIA (2016), https://www.mnn.org/sites/default/files/mnn_ar_122917.pdf.
155 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).  Facebook is the clear leader; in 2016, 90% of
the one million most shared articles were shared on Facebook, with Twitter coming in a
distant second at around 6%. Facebook Grows as Dominant Content Sharing Destination, MAR-
KETING CHARTS (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.marketingcharts.com/digital-70111.
156 Top Sites in United States, ALEXA, https://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/US (last
visited Oct. 27, 2018).
157 Id.
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most visited sites, Google and YouTube, are owned by the same parent com-
pany, Alphabet.158  The high traffic reflects the sheer mass of people who use
the most popular social media sites.  Facebook alone has 2.234 billion users
globally, followed by YouTube at 1.9 billion.159  Twitter has 335 million
users.160  By way of comparison, the world’s most populous country, China,
has 1.4 billion people, and the United States is home to around 327 mil-
lion.161  Thus, the two most visited and most used social media sites,
Facebook and YouTube, are individually home to more people than the larg-
est nation in the world.
Within the United States, 60% of the population uses social media at
least once a month, and in turn Facebook alone is used by 60% of all internet
users, or 169.5 million people.162  YouTube represents a similar share of the
population, with 58% of Americans using that site.163  Americans’ use of
social media goes beyond conversing with friends.  The Pew Research Center
found that in 2017, 43% of Americans frequently got their news online, clos-
ing in on the 50% who primarily relied on television.164  More importantly,
fully two-thirds of Americans reported getting at least some of their news
from social media.165  Facebook was once again the clear leader, with some
45% of Americans getting news on that site.166  These users often overlap,
with 26% of Americans getting news from more than one social media
site.167
Social media sites do not passively observe the activities of their millions
of users.  Social media users’ activities can be tracked by the websites and the
collected data can be used for microtargeting, wherein the sites build up a
psychological profile of the user and target advertisements tailored to the
user’s personality.168  Facebook’s user interface lends itself to this kind of
data collection and analysis, as users can indicate their preferences for cer-
tain topics—from fashion to politics—through “likes.”169  By compiling these
likes, data analysts can make predictions about a user’s demographic infor-
mation, including political affiliation.170  People’s deepest attributes can be
158 Alejandro Alba, A List—from A to Z—of All the Companies, Brands Google’s Alphabet
Currently Owns, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/
world/z-list-brands-companies-google-alphabet-owns-article-1.2321981.
159 Most Popular Social Networks, supra note 10.
160 Id.
161 2019 World Population, supra note 11.
162 Ferguson, supra note 26.
163 Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 27.
164 Gottfried & Shearer, supra note 28.
165 Shearer & Gottfried, supra note 27.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Semple, supra note 30.
169 Michal Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of
Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 5802 (2013).
170 Id. at 5804.
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“automatically and accurately” gleaned from their Facebook likes, and that is
before analyzing things such as their online purchases or search histories.171
Targeted advertising based on social media analysis has great political
ramifications that have already changed elections in the United States.
Microtargeting was first used on a wide scale for political advertising in the
United States during the 2012 presidential elections.172  Government action
had made the data crunching easier: in the wake of the controversies over
the 2000 presidential election, voter registration information was digi-
tized.173  Analysts hired by the presidential campaigns used the digitized
voter rolls to match social media users with potential voters and targeted ads
accordingly.174  The Obama campaign looked up those who were voting
early in the election and used their social media profiles to gauge which can-
didate they were likely to have voted for, hoping to identify areas where
Obama was likely trailing his challenger.175  The campaign then used that
information to target get-out-the-vote ads at likely Democratic voters in those
areas; President Obama went on to win reelection.176
The political use of social media reached new levels of notoriety in the
2016 presidential election.  Facebook in particular came under scrutiny for
the role it played in the final outcome: the election of Donald Trump.177
During that election, Facebook offered to embed its operatives in each of the
opposing campaigns to assist them in crafting their Facebook outreach.178
While Hillary Clinton’s campaign declined, President Trump’s campaign
accepted.179  The Trump campaign also worked with embedded operatives
from Google and Twitter, as well as the private firm Cambridge Analytica, all
under the direction of Brad Parscale.180  Parscale took charge of data analy-
sis, using it to frame microtargeting campaigns in crucial swing states like
171 Id. at 5805.
172 Brennan, supra note 31.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Sasha Issenberg, How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters, MIT TECH. REV.
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/509026/how-obamas-team-used-
big-data-to-rally-voters/.
176 Id.
177 See Eve Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook and Google—and What They Can
Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-
techlash-against-amazon-facebook-and-google-and-what-they-can-do?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/
ed/thetechlashagainstamazonfacebookandgoogleandwhattheycandoamemotobigtech.
178 See Evan Osnos, Can Mark Zuckerberg Fix Facebook Before It Breaks Democracy?, NEW
YORKER (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/can-mark-
zuckerberg-fix-facebook-before-it-breaks-democracy.
179 Id.
180 Nolan D. McCaskill & Darren Samuelsohn, Trump Campaign’s Digital Director Agrees to
Meet with House Intel Committee, POLITICO (July 14, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/
2017/07/14/brad-parscale-trump-digital-house-intel-committee-240557.
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Michigan and Wisconsin.181  The Trump campaign also used social media as
a major source of campaign money; the campaign netted $280 million from
fundraising on Facebook alone.182  Though both campaigns used
microtargeting on social media, the Trump campaign was far more aggres-
sive—and ultimately effective—than the Clinton campaign.183  Indeed, the
Trump campaign spent 47% of its advertising budget on digital media, while
the Clinton campaign spent just 8%.184  Trump focused on men and conserv-
atives—his putative base,185 and a strategy that contributed to his election.  A
subsequent study found that Trump’s microtargeting of Republicans with
Facebook ads increased their likelihood to vote by 5%–10%.186  Facebook
ads also had the effect of turning undecided voters toward the Trump
camp.187  Theresa Hong, another digital content worker for the Trump cam-
paign, stated bluntly that “[w]ithout Facebook we wouldn’t have won.”188
Facebook itself had tested its ability to influence voting in a prior elec-
tion.  During the 2010 midterm elections, Facebook targeted sixty million of
its users with messages encouraging the site’s visitors to go out and vote,
though it did not advocate for any particular candidate or party.189  Those
who viewed the message could click a button to announce they had voted
and see up to six friends who had done the same.190  Facebook analyzed its
users’ data and found that the messages encouraged some 60,000 people to
vote who otherwise would not have, and they in turn encouraged a total of
340,000 additional voters.191  For Jonathan Zittrain, a professor at Harvard
Law School, the success of Facebook’s experiment raised the specter of “digi-
tal gerrymandering,” which he defined as “the selective presentation of infor-
mation by an intermediary to meet its agenda rather than to serve its
users.”192  Should Facebook target such a get-out-the-vote campaign at users
of a certain political stance, and exclude those identifying with the opposite
camp, a single private company could potentially swing an election.193
Facebook’s intentions aside, its power to influence voters is readily
apparent.194
181 Parscale: TV News “Thought I Was a Joke,” supra note 32.  Oddly enough, according to
Parscale, Donald Trump himself was skeptical of the value of digital advertising, preferring
to focus on television commercials.  His doubts were dispelled only after his victory. Id.
182 Osnos, supra note 178.
183 Liberini et al., supra note 8, at 2.
184 Id. at 1–2.
185 Id. at 27.
186 Id. at 5.
187 Id.
188 Osnos, supra note 178.
189 Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 336 (2014).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 336
192 Id.
193 See id.
194 Facebook did introduce new procedures after the 2016 elections to deter the spread
of “fake news” and misleading information, which some argue heavily reduced Facebook’s
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It is no surprise that the largest social media sites are the focus of such
intense political activity.  The utility of social networks depends on their size,
as a network with a small number of users has less value than a larger one.195
There is simply more information to be gleaned from a larger network of
people, a benefit to users and advertisers alike.196  Social media sites with
“few users are worthless except for niche purposes.”197  Such niche purposes
often have negative effects.  Gab is a nascent social networking site specifi-
cally founded to promote free speech and challenge the dominance of the
larger social media sites.198  Compared to the billions on Facebook, Gab is
microscopic: in 2018, it reported having only 394,000 users.199  Given its few
restrictions on the nature of content, it has attracted a large number of so-
called “alt-right” users, including violent racists and white supremacists
banned from the larger sites for their hateful comments.200  This is hardly an
enticing alternative to Facebook, and is but one example of how high the
barriers are to breaking Facebook’s dominance in social media use.201
B. Social Media’s Control Over Content
Moreover, the control that the leading social media sites exert on the
content their users publish is increasingly reminiscent of that a state entity
would exercise.  As Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, himself said,
“In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional com-
pany.  We have this large community of people, and more than other tech-
nology companies we’re really setting policies.”202
Facebook stands out among social media sites because of its sheer size.
Its regulations on content thus affect an immense group of people.
Facebook requires its users to abide by its terms of service.203  These
influence in the 2018 elections. See Alexis C. Madrigal, The Facebook Election That Wasn’t,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/the-
facebook-election-that-wasnt/574996/.
195 Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1787
(2012).
196 Id. at 1788.
197 Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1371
(2018).
198 Alina Selyukh, Feeling Sidelined by Mainstream Social Media, Far-Right Users Jump to Gab,
NPR (May 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/05/21/
529005840/feeling-sidelined-by-mainstream-social-media-far-right-users-jump-to-gab.
199 GAB AI INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2018).
200 See Emma Grey Ellis, Gab, the Alt-Right’s Very Own Twitter, Is the Ultimate Filter Bubble,
WIRED (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/09/gab-alt-rights-twitter-ultimate-fil
ter-bubble/.
201 See Langvardt, supra note 197, at 1384.
202 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 254 (2010).  Zuckerberg made that state-
ment about his conversations with the chief operating officer of Facebook, Sheryl
Sandberg, intrigued by her former work in government.
203 Terms of Service, supra note 42.
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expressly state that users must adhere to Facebook’s community standards.204
These standards describe Facebook as a place for people “to share their
experiences, connect with friends and family, and build communities.”205
The standards serve to keep “abuse off our service,” and they apply “around
the world, and to all types of content.”206  These standards are meant to be as
comprehensive and far reaching as possible; Facebook states that even “con-
tent that might not be considered hateful may still be removed for violating a
different policy.”207  Those who violate Facebook’s standards face varying
levels of consequences based on the nature of the infraction.208  First-time
violators may get off with only a warning, but serial violators may see their
ability to post content restricted or have their profiles disabled entirely.209
The standards explicitly ban the use of hate speech, which are defined as an
attack on people based on certain “protected characteristics—race, ethnicity,
national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender,
gender identity, and serious disease or disability.”210  An “attack” is defined
as “violent or dehumanizing speech, statements of inferiority, or calls for
exclusion or segregation.”211  Such regulations are among the reasons many
extremists have moved to other sites such as Gab, where the echo-chamber
effect may actually radicalize such persons further.212  The community stan-
dards and terms of service show that, even while serving as a public forum,
Facebook intends to maintain limits on what content is permissible on its site.
Facebook’s mechanism for enforcing its standards ultimately relies on a
mix of digital and human means.  Given the sheer size of Facebook’s user
base, it necessarily relies on automatic digital processes to proactively flag
content.213  Nonetheless, millions of reports must still be reviewed by human
moderators, trained by Facebook in its standards.214  Facebook employs at
least forty-five hundred content moderators, who work out of undisclosed
locations around the world.215  The job can be incredibly stressful, and the
nature of the content has at times left some moderators traumatized.216
204 Id.
205 Community Standards: Introduction, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communi
tystandards/introduction (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Community Standards: Objectionable Content, supra note 36.
211 Id.
212 See Ali Breland, Twitter Crackdown Sparks Free Speech Concerns, HILL (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/360806-twitter-crackdown-sparks-free-speech-con
cerns (“[I]f you drive them underground . . . they’re going to radicalize further . . . .” (first
omission in original)).
213 Nick Hopkins, Facebook Moderators: A Quick Guide to Their Job and Its Challenges,
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/facebook-
moderators-quick-guide-job-challenges.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
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Facebook’s moderators find themselves trying to balance the ability of
Facebook’s users to express themselves with Facebook’s goal of blocking
harmful content as defined in its community standards.217  As Carl Miller, a
social media researcher at the thinktank Demos, put it: “Private companies
are doing what we’ve only really expected constituted officials of sovereign
power to do.”218
In fact, this regulation of content stands in contrast to what American
jurisprudence permits of government actors.  When American courts review
restrictions on speech, they subject those that focus on the content of that
speech to strict scrutiny.219  Indeed, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, “[t]he
Constitution ‘demands that content-based restrictions on speech be pre-
sumed invalid . . . and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality.’”220  There are some kinds of speech that can be restricted
based on content, but these are limited to a small number of “historic and
traditional categories” of speech, including incitement, obscenity, defama-
tion, speech integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography,
fraud, true threats, and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat
the government has the power to prevent.”221  Facebook, in contrast, follows
a much stricter standard for what it considers “hate speech,” as described
above.  For the nearly two-thirds of Americans who use Facebook, their
online speech is subject to stricter restrictions based on content than is their
everyday speech, based on free speech jurisprudence.
Most interestingly, Facebook has introduced rules governing the disclo-
sure of political ads on its site that closely parallel those in place in American
election law.  Facebook faced heavy criticism for allowing political ads on its
site that were paid for by Russian agents intending to influence the 2016
election.222  Facebook adopted a policy on political ads that subjected such
ads to special requirements, stating, “[a]dvertisers can run ads about social
issues, elections or politics, provided the advertiser complies with all applica-
ble laws and the authorization process required by Facebook.”223  The policy
applies to any ads paid for by a political candidate, promoting voting, relating
to “any social issue in any place where the ad is being run,” or subject to
217 See Olivia Solon, To Censor or Sanction Extreme Content? Either Way, Facebook Can’t Win,
GUARDIAN (May 23, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/facebook-
moderator-guidelines-extreme-content-analysis.
218 Id.
219 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 567 U.S. 709
(2012).
220 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 716–17 (plurality opinion) (omission in original) (quoting Ash-
croft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)).
221 Id. at 717 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010)).
222 Nancy Scola, Facebook Rolls Out Political Ad Disclosures, POLITICO (May 24, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/24/facebook-rolls-out-political-ad-disclosures-
1299421.
223 Advertising Policies: 10.a Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted_content/political (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
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regulation as political advertising.224  Facebook will not approve an ad that
does not comply with laws regarding political advertising.225  Facebook put
the new policy into effect on May 24, 2018.226  It now requires all “election-
related and issue ads” to include a “Paid for by” disclaimer.227  This mimics
exactly the requirements of U.S. election law for campaign advertisements.
Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, candidates for political
office must identify themselves and give explicit statements of endorsement
for any advertisements run by their campaigns.228  The law applies only to
radio and television ads.229  Federal regulations also require disclosure for
printed material.230  Now, there also exist regulations for online advertising,
not due to any government action, but due to the action of the world’s larg-
est social networking site.
The other large social media sites maintain similar content regulation
regimes.  Twitter initially stood out for its commitment to unfettered expres-
sion, bluntly declaring that Twitter represented the “free speech wing of the
free speech party.”231  Now its cofounder, Evan Williams, has expressed
doubts, saying, “I thought once everybody could speak freely and exchange
information and ideas, the world is automatically going to be a better
place . . . . I was wrong about that.”232  In light of that change of heart,
Twitter requires that its users abide by its Twitter rules.233  The rules are
much like Facebook’s community standards: promoting violence, making
threats, and harassing particular groups, which includes the use of “[h]ateful
conduct,” are all prohibited.234  Moreover, Twitter’s terms “may change from
time to time, at [its] discretion.”235
YouTube also maintains its own rules, including provisions for keeping
videos up while stripping them of advertising revenue.  YouTube restricts
224 See id.
225 Id.
226 Shining a Light on Ads with Political Content, supra note 34.
227 Id.
228 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 311, 116 Stat. 81,
105–06.  This is often called the “McCain–Feingold” legislation after the two senators who
first proposed it. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Bipartisan_Campaign_Reform_Act (last visited May 23, 2019).
229 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 311.
230 See Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Prohibitions, 11 C.F.R. § 110.11
(2019) (to be codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30120).
231 Josh Halliday, Twitter’s Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech Party,’
GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-
tony-wang-free-speech.
232 David Streitfeld, ‘The Internet Is Broken’: @ev Is Trying to Salvage It, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/technology/evan-williams-medium-twitter-
internet.html.
233 Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 25, 2018), https://twitter.com/en/tos.
234 The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-
rules (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
235 Twitter Terms of Service, supra note 233.
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access to videos that it judges to be “[n]ot suitable for most advertisers.”236
This means that the videos will be limited in their appearances in searches
and will not host ads, thus generating no advertising revenue for users who
choose to post the videos.237  YouTube’s decision to demonetize videos hurt
many content creators, as they relied on YouTube ad revenue to finance their
operations.238
The social media companies regulate content for their own purposes—
namely, advertising revenue.  A service dominated by extremist, violent, or
pornographic content would not draw in many users, hurting the social
media companies’ opportunities for selling ads.239  As noted by Kate Klonick
of St. John’s University Law School, “the primary reason companies take
down obscene and violent material is the threat that allowing such material
poses to potential profits based in advertising revenue.”240  However, as
noted, the social media sites operate outside any government control, and
are not subject to the same limits as the government.  In particular,
Facebook’s attempt to pinpoint the source of ads could have a chilling effect
on political discourse. New York Times tech columnist Farhad Manjoo has
pointed out that Facebook is indeed becoming governmental in its reach and
control, especially with regards to politically oriented posts.241  He observed,
Facebook would sort of be in some way the arbiter for what’s right and
wrong on Facebook.  That may help with the fake news problem.  I think it’s
unclear at this point.  But the kind of upshot of that is, on the other hand,
you get Facebook kind of acting as something like the ministry of informa-
tion for kind of every country in which it operates, where, you know, it might
be able to decide, like, this is true, and this is not true.242
The incredible size and wide-reaching influence of the largest social
media sites reveals the immense importance they hold in public discourse in
the twenty-first century.  Some observers have already likened it to a modern
public square.  Zeynep Tufekci, a professor at the University of North Caro-
lina, has explicitly called the internet “our social commons.”243 Social inter-
action is a key part of being human, and so every society has its “commons,” a
236 Request Human Review of Videos Marked “Not Suitable for Most Advertisers,” YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7083671?hl=en&ref_topic=9153572 (last
visited Oct. 9, 2019).
237 See id.
238 Sahil Patel, The ‘Demonetized’: YouTube’s Brand-Safety Crackdown Has Collateral Damage,
DIGIDAY (Sept. 6, 2017), https://digiday.com/media/advertisers-may-have-returned-to-you
tube-but-creators-are-still-losing-out-on-revenue/.
239 Kevin Roose, On Gab, an Extremist-Friendly Site, Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Aired His
Hatred in Full, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/us/gab-
robert-bowers-pittsburgh-synagogue-shootings.html.
240 Klonick, supra note 155, at 1627.
241 See How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like Governments Than Companies, NPR (Oct.
26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-become-
more-like-governments-than-companies (interviewing Farhad Manjoo).
242 Id.
243 Tufekci, Google Buzz, supra note, at 39.
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place where people can most easily engage in social interaction.244  Using
social media—and particularly Facebook, given its massive user base—is
hardly “optional.”245  Professor Tufekci compared a decision not to use social
media as akin to a decision not to use antibiotics—technically it is an option,
but the results will be very negative.246  Hundreds upon hundreds of millions
of people use Facebook as their social commons, expecting to find it a free
space with which to interact with others.247  And yet this social infrastructure
is under complete private control, which Tufekci explicitly calls a “company
town.”248  The parallels to Marsh could not be more clear, for the digital
company town of today has a level of control over public discourse much like
that Justice Black feared.  As Justice Black said in Marsh, “The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in gen-
eral, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and con-
stitutional rights of those who use it.”249
Like Professor Tufekci, Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School
points out that social interaction is in a special category.250  Information is no
normal commodity.251  The passage of information necessarily involves indi-
vidual expression in a way any other product could not.252  Wu sees the social
media giants as part of an information industry embedded into the eco-
nomic, political, and social lives of all of us.253  Social media thus plays an
integral part in the very question of whose voice gets heard in our society.
Leslie Berlin, a historian of technology at Stanford, has acknowledged the
immense power Facebook could potentially wield over the flow of informa-
tion in society: “[T]he question Mark Zuckerberg is dealing with is: Should
my company be the arbiter of truth and decency for two billion people?
Nobody in the history of technology has dealt with that.”254
As Wu points out, there is a discomforting historical parallel to this situa-
tion.  In the 1930s, movie production in Hollywood came under the control
of a private monopoly that enforced strict rules of what could and could not
be depicted onscreen.255  Catholic activists had long been clamoring for
more regulation of the content of motion pictures, believing their wanton
depictions of sexuality and crime had a corrupting influence on society.256
244 Tufekci, Facebook, supra note 38.
245 Tufekci, Google Buzz, supra note 39.
246 See id.
247 Tufekci, Google Buzz, supra note 39.
248 Tufekci, Facebook, supra note 38.
249 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
250 WU, supra note 40, at 302.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 301–02.
253 See id. at 303.
254 Osnos, supra note 178.
255 WU, supra note 40, at 119.
256 See id. at 115–16; see also THOMAS DOHERTY, HOLLYWOOD’S CENSOR 59–60 (2007)
(detailing social science research of the 1930s that allegedly proved films had a corrupting
influence on the youth).
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Their criticisms were hurting the public image of the film industry,257 and
the filmmakers feared the public outcry might invite a government crack-
down.258  In response to such criticism, Hollywood, acting through the
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), moved to
censor itself through the implementation of the Production Code in 1934.259
The code required films to maintain a clear distinction between the concepts
of good and evil, as understood by Hollywood’s conservative critics, and
severely restricted any depictions of sexuality.260  No theater could show a
film that violated the code, to which all film production companies acceded,
without being heavily fined.261
Implementation of the code fell under the influence of one particularly
powerful member of the MPPDA, Joseph Breen, a conservative Catholic who
in time became the sole judge of whether or not a film met the requirements
of the code.262  That such an immense power over expression was vested in
one man was not lost on observers at the time.  One magazine described
Breen as having probably “more influence in standardizing world thinking
than Mussolini, Hitler, or Stalin,” and “possibly more than the Pope.”263  It
was not until after World War II, when television and foreign films started
offering viable entertainment alternatives to Hollywood films, that the code’s
grip started to slip.264  Still, it was only abandoned in 1968, and replaced with
the modern rating system.265
Such a standardization in thinking resulted from the control of only one
medium, film, while social media has a much wider reach.266  The censorship
did not come from the government, but the control over an entire form of
expression was still total.267  Wu regards the historical example of the code as
a kind of barrier to entry to the “marketplace of ideas.”268  The idea of such a
market for ideas originates in a famous dissenting opinion from one of the
most celebrated Justices of the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.269
Writing in Abrams v. United States, he argued that “the ultimate good desired
257 See Bob Mondello, Remembering Hollywood’s Hays Code, 40 Years On, NPR (Aug. 8,
2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93301189.
258 DOHERTY, supra note 256, at 59.
259 See WU, supra note 40, at 116–17, 123.  The code was commonly called the “Hays
Code” as the committee that drafted it was headed by former Postmaster General Will
Hays.  Mondello, supra note 257.
260 WU, supra note 40, at 120–21.
261 Id. at 119.
262 Id. at 123.
263 Frederick James Smith, Hollywood’s New Purity Tape Measure, LIBERTY MAG., Aug. 15,
1936, at 43.  Interestingly, the Italian dictator Mussolini did have a slight influence on
Breen, publicly condemning any negative reference to spaghetti in film. Id.
264 Mondello, supra note 257.
265 Id.
266 See WU, supra note 40, at 117, 302.
267 See id. at 117.
268 Id. at 122.
269 See id.; Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket.”270  As Wu notes, private action can serve as much as a stumbling block
to certain kinds of expression as government action.271
The largest social media sites of today have such a dominant role in dis-
course over the internet that it is hard for any meaningful expression of ideas
to occur outside their reach.  Billions of people are on Facebook alone, in
effect transitioning the social commons onto a single platform.  Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter all have regulations that, for good or ill, determine
what content can appear on those sites.  In the case of political ads, Facebook
has regulations that parallel those put in place by the United States govern-
ment.  This comes at a time when American elections are increasingly waged
on social media and when some forces are already finding their voices
silenced on those platforms.  Even the closest historical parallel, the
Hollywood Code, does not reach the scale of social media’s control, as film
remained in competition with other media for entertainment and so offered
the public an alternative means of expression.  With social media, the lack of
meaningful alternatives means that free expression exists at the sufferance of
the private entities that dominate so many aspects of modern life.
III. CAN WE DO ANYTHING?  SHOULD WE?
This Part will consider the main possible objections to the regulation of
privately owned social media companies as private entities.  First, it may be
objected that the social media companies are publishers and so have their
own free speech rights in their decisions regarding what content appears on
their sites.  This ignores the fact, however, that the social media sites are not
acting as publishers, openly soliciting content.  Rather, the users are the pub-
lishers.  Second, since the government is much more limited in its ability to
censor hateful content, treating social media companies as state actors would
likewise limit their ability to do the same.  But limiting access to even the
largest social media sites does not prevent extremists from engaging in hate-
ful conduct elsewhere, including violence.  At any rate, the free speech rights
of all social media users—the vast majority of us—are at stake, and so this
interest must take precedence.
A. Social Media Are Not Publishers
It is certainly true that entities that publish content have their own free
speech rights just as the creators of that content do.  The Supreme Court
held as much in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.272  Florida law at the
time required newspapers that published editorials critical of a candidate to
allow that candidate to publish a response in the same paper.273  The Court
270 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
271 See WU, supra note 40, at 122.
272 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
273 Id. at 244.
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acknowledged that access to alternative means of expressing an objection
were limited, given that many media interests are concentrated in the same
hands.274  But newspapers were (and are) themselves engaged in speech, and
have the right to express their views without being forced by the government
to express the views of others.275  The Court was adamant:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, . . . whether fair or unfair[,]
constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment.  It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be
exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they
have evolved to this time.276
The Florida law was thus unconstitutional.277
The largest social media sites have not held themselves out as publishers,
and in relation to the content created by their users, do indeed act more like
forums than publishers. Packingham suggests that the Court considers social
media to be a public forum rather a collection of publishers.278  Moreover,
social media platforms do not actively solicit specific content to be published
on their sites, which Professor Klonick notes is “unlike how an editorial desk
might solicit reporting or journalistic coverage.”279  This lack of active solici-
tation with regards to its users is in contrast to the publishing activities some
social media sites do offer, like streaming original films.280  Describing social
media sites as publishers would also go against their own self-characteriza-
tions.  Facebook’s terms of service explicitly state that its service is meant to
“[e]mpower you [the user] to express yourself and communicate about what
matters to you.”281  YouTube declares its mission is “to give everyone a voice
and show them the world.”282  It defines its values as based on freedom of
expression, freedom of information, freedom of opportunity, and freedom
to belong.283  The image social media sites create for themselves at least sug-
gests a forum for others to create content, not a publisher of content itself.
Calling Facebook a publisher would contradict the statements of its own
founder.  Mark Zuckerberg was called before a U.S. Senate committee and
was directly asked, “Are you a tech company, or are you the world’s largest
publisher?”284  Zuckerberg responded, “I view us as a tech company, because
274 Id. at 249–50.
275 Id. at 255–56.
276 Id. at 258.
277 Id.
278 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
279 Klonick, supra note 155, at 1660.
280 For example, YouTube does create some original content of its own, but this is a
paid service separate from the main part of the site.  Ben Popper, Red Dawn: An Inside Look
at YouTube’s New Ad-Free Subscription Service, VERGE, https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/
21/9566973/youtube-red-ad-free-offline-paid-subscription-service (last visited Nov. 17,
2019).
281 Terms of Service, supra note 42.
282 About YouTube, supra note 12.
283 Id.
284 Ferguson, supra note 26.
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the primary thing that we do is build technology and products.”285  He pro-
ceeded to say that, nonetheless, he felt Facebook was responsible for the con-
tent on its site.286
The law, however, exempts online content hosts—including social
media—from responsibility for the content they host, explicitly defining
them as not being publishers.  Congress passed the Communications Decency
Act in 1996 “to promote the continued development of the Internet” and “to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that . . . exists for the
Internet.”287  To that end, Congress included § 230(c), regarding the “block-
ing and screening of offensive material.”288  The law is succinct: “No provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content pro-
vider.”289  The section further immunizes online content hosts from civil lia-
bility for any action taken in good faith to restrict access to material that the
host considers to be “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is consti-
tutionally protected.”290  Torts such as defamation provide a good example
of the ramifications of this immunity.  Historically, publishing defamatory
material opened the publisher to tort liability the same as the defamatory
author.291  To prevent tort claims from hampering the development of the
internet, Congress simply declared online content hosts not to be publishers
by operation of law.
While a case involving § 230(c) of the law has not reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, the lower courts have been “[n]ear-unanimous” in constru-
ing the law to provide internet content hosts immunity from any liability for
content posted by third parties.292  Within a year of the law’s passage, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed down the first major
decision involving the statute in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.293  There, the
plaintiff had sued America Online for failing to remove defamatory posts
made by unknown third parties.294  The court unanimously held that
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996) (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 230).
288 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
289 Id. § 230(c)(1).
290 Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).
291 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  Indeed,
each time a publisher reprints defamatory material, it gives rise to a new and separate
cause of action—against the publisher, not the original author of the defamatory words.
Id. cmt. b.
292 Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under the Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 2d 681, 688 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
293 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).  Those were truly the earliest days of the internet, for
the court noted that the internet in 1997 was used by “approximately 40 million people”—
miniscule in comparison to today’s billions. Id. at 328.
294 Id. at 328.
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§ 230(c) barred any suit that would put the content host in the position of a
publisher.295  Indeed, even if the host exercised a “publisher’s traditional
editorial functions,” like deciding to remove content, any civil suit would be
barred.296  Thus, even when an internet content host might in fact be a pub-
lisher, it would still not be one in the eyes of the law.  Tellingly, the court in
Zeran understood Congress’s purpose was to neutralize any threat “to freedom
of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.”297  Facebook, too,
has taken advantage of § 230(c) to escape liability in a defamation suit.298  In
that case, the court held that “a website does not create or develop content
when it merely provides a neutral means by which third parties can post
information of their own independent choosing online.”299  That holding
succinctly states the true role social media sites play: not as publishers, but as
hosts of the publications of others.  To enjoy immunity from tort liability,
social media sites must necessarily be public forums, not publishers, but by
the same logic they lose the First Amendment protections for editorial deci-
sions Tornillo extended to publishers.
B. The Issue of Hate Speech
Some might charge that, if subject to the same rules as the government,
the social media sites would be unable to prevent hate speech from spread-
ing.300  But banning extremist and hateful voices from the major social net-
works has not silenced them altogether.  Pushing extremist users into forums
where few, if any, countervailing voices can be heard risks “radicalizing” them
further.301  Twitter’s policies caused many white supremacists to retreat to
the alternative social networking site, Gab, and this created an echo-chamber
effect whereby the most violent and extreme voices were amplified.302  Rob-
ert Bowers, the accused killer of eleven people at a Pittsburgh synagogue, was
a Gab user and often posted anti-Semitic content on the site.303  Removing
the most extreme content from the larger sites may have prevented it from
reaching a wider audience, but it did not prevent extremism from reaching
its most receptive audience.  Moreover, the Pittsburgh shooting shows that
restricting extremists from the main social media sites will not eliminate vio-
lence altogether.  It even raises the possibility that exclusion will only exacer-
bate the issue, building resentment in banned individuals that will feed a
cycle of hate.  As journalist Ian Miles Cheong pointed out, “if you drive them
underground . . . they’re going to radicalize further.”304  He added that
295 Id. at 330.
296 Id.
297 Id. (emphasis added).
298 Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
299 Id. at 1358.
300 See Ferguson, supra note 26.
301 Breland, supra note 212.
302 Ellis, supra note 200.
303 Roose, supra note 239.
304 Breland, supra note 212 (omission in original).
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“[t]he best way to counter arguments is to provide good arguments.”305  That
line is reminiscent of Justice Kennedy’s admonition in United States v. Alva-
rez—“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.”306  The
American tradition is to meet hateful speech with nobler, and more numer-
ous, speech.
At stake also are the free speech rights of the majority of users who are
not engaged in hateful conduct.  As historian Niall Ferguson has noted, per-
mitting obscene or even hateful content may be worth its risks, as it is prefer-
able to a system where “our freedom of speech [is] circumscribed by the
community standards of unaccountable private companies, run by men who
imagine themselves to be emperors.”307
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the public function exception to the state
action doctrine should include the largest social media companies.  The free
spread of information is undoubtedly a major component of a free and dem-
ocratic society.  Traditionally, the government was seen as the primary threat
to the free expression of ideas.  Historically, the government could not touch
free expression based on its content, but for exceptions for things such as
libel, incitement of violence, or fraud.  One notable exception was made in
Marsh, for a company town.  There, a private entity owned the entire munici-
pality and was responsible for all municipal functions.  Because the private
entity functioned in all respects like a city, it was, for all intents and purposes,
a state actor.  As such, it was subject to claims based on the First Amend-
ment’s protection of free speech.
Marsh has long since been treated as being of limited utility.  Most pri-
vately owned public places do not have the same level of total control as the
company town in Marsh.  But in the twenty-first century, there is a
noncorporeal company town.  Expression on the internet is conducted on
social media sites.  Facebook alone has two billion members—in essence, the
largest nation on Earth.  Twitter has a user base larger than the population of
the United States.  Within the United States, social media is well on its way to
outstripping traditional media as the main source of information for the pub-
lic.  Social media has already had an enormous impact on the political world.
Facebook has even imposed regulations on electoral advertising of the same
nature as the law requires in offline media.  The internet, and especially
social media, is indeed the modern public forum.  And yet the largest social
media companies have so far remained immune from any judicial remedies
should they violate the free expression of their users.  The law does, in fact,
and should, allow an exception to the state action doctrine when private
power becomes so great it threatens freedom in the same way as does a state.
305 Id.
306 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (plurality opinion).
307 Ferguson, supra note 26.  Ferguson’s reference to “men who imagine themselves to
be emperors” is a reference to Mark Zuckerberg, who has indicated his favorite historical
figure is the Roman emperor Augustus. Id.; see Osnos, supra note 178.
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